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Abstract 
Shaping policy for environmental sustainability depends upon decision-makers conceptualizing 
problems in ways that are either shared or similar enough to communicate about, diagnose, and act. 
The quality of this shared mental model of a social–ecological system (SES) is paramount to its 
effectiveness. Fundamentally, the mental model must integrate multiple kinds of knowledge about 
the system. If the decision-making body's assumptions about, description of, and solution for a 
problem do not to reflect the many ways stakeholders know a system, then the products of that 
decision-making process are viewed as illegitimate. Sustainability policy must fit the often subtle 
social order of the communities expected to implement it. In this essay, we discuss how a systems-
based perspective can be a versatile tool for tackling these challenges of knowledge integration and 
decision-making in the context of a complex SES. Using social theory of Pierre Bourdieu, we 
construct a conceptual model that illustrates a route for integrating locally known social complexities 
(power, influence) gleaned from stakeholder interviews (N = 57). Stakeholders and end-user groups 
may dismiss any model that they perceive fails to satisfactorily account for specific, locally salient 
social nuances. Our approach leverages the overlapping notion of “capital” in social and ecological 
theory to demonstrate how reciprocal interactions between human and ecological systems can be 
adopted into tools for reaching viable solutions to SES problems. 
 
Keywords: Sustainability science, Social capital, Power, Boundary object, Water resources management, 
Floodplain development, Riparian ecology 
 
1. Introduction: Integrating Different Ways of Knowing  
 
One of the challenges for transdisciplinary sustainability-science research is to integrate 
different kinds of knowledge into usable forms relevant to the diverse audiences tasked with 
addressing sustainability problems. Bringing scientific, technical, experienced, and tacit views of a 
system into alignment with each other is critical for developing a shared body of assumptions 
from which to make decisions. Shared conceptualizations of a system must be salient, legitimate, 
and credible to all parties’ perspectives involved in planning if those policies made are to satisfy 
the persons expected to implement them (Clark et al., 2011). This task moves past 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary efforts at social and biophysical science collaboration. 
Combining scientific and lay knowledge into an accessible—and politically acceptable—
representation of a system that then becomes a tool for deliberating about environmental 
problems and making decisions requires treating local social and political complexities with the 
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same quality of attention typically afforded to the biophysical components. 
One way in which to explore transdisciplinary knowledge integration is through "boundary 
objects", a category of shared tools for deliberation. Boundary objects are collaborative 
products—maps, reports, decision tools, forecasts, models, others—created by various actors that 
are adaptable to different viewpoints and yet robust enough to be meaningful to each group’s 
adherents (Cash et al., 2003; Clark et al., 2011; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Boundary objects are 
useful ways of representing constituent knowledge relevant to all interested parties. By pursuing 
strategically the interests of all parties, boundary objects project authority. Ultimately, the purpose 
of these intermediary tools is to facilitate relationships between science, society, and decision-
making that lead to more productive policy making (Jasanoff, 1990).  
 
1.1 Models as Boundary Objects 
When systems models—conceptual or mathematical models of social–ecological systems 
designed for prediction or explanation (cf. Hall, Lazarus, & Swannack, 2014)—are constructed 
utilizing the expertise of many, they can serve as a boundary object that bridge seemingly 
disparate forms of knowledge. Models can be powerful tools for decision making with lasting 
implications upon social order. They can capture the dynamics of various realities’ and their 
moving parts simultaneously. Models can represent integrated interdisciplinary science (Grant, 
1998; Heemskerk, Wilson, & Pavao-Zuckerman, 2003; van der Leeuw, 2004). Furthermore, 
scholars are increasingly incorporating lay characterizations of resource systems into models of 
human–environment dynamics (Cash, Borck, & Patt, 2006; Clark, 2007; Kates, 2011; Kates et al., 
2001; Pohl, 2011; Schmolke, Thorbek, DeAngelis, & Grimm, 2010; Talwar, Wiek, & Robinson, 
2011).  
As representations of reality, models can provide means of orientation within a problem space 
and shape the basis for decision making. Models are sometimes compared to maps (Robinson, 
1991) that chart a course through a conceptual landscape, unfamiliar or familiar. Models have 
been compared to narratives (Allen, Zellmer, & Wuennenbeg, 2005) capable of making sense of 
complexity via a coherent, temporally structured, internally consistent, familiar, and pleasing form 
of story told to a specific audience. Models also have been compared to landscape paintings 
(Dietrich, Bellugi, Sklar, & Stock, 2003) where varying forms of realism reflect various realities. In 
these metaphors and in others, the power of a model is in its appeal to multiple or diverse 
audience as a way to lend transparency to an otherwise opaque or occluded technical idea, 
concept, construction, description, or argument.  
Essentially, models are tools for communication (Hall et al., 2014), and the process of creating a 
model forces the model builders to enunciate clearly their held assumptions (Krebs, 2005; 
Voinov, Seppelt, Reis, Nabel, & Shokravi, 2014). An effective model can illuminate, demonstrate, 
and articulate relationships among disparate parts of a system with a degree of precision not 
afforded by language alone (van der Leeuw, 2011). Models thus offer a means of communicating 
about complexity. Inescapable, then is the fact that the very act of communicating the rationale, 
concept, results, implications, and limitations of a model influences how the model is used and 
perceived (Hall et al., 2014).  
 
1.2 A Critique of Models 
Models have been criticized for providing only the selective view of reality that is 
convenient for the modeling process; as a result, socio-political and cultural dynamics that are 
especially challenging to capture and render in abstraction may be glossed over in favor of more 
manageable representations (Crane, 2010; Lucie, Gauvin, & Raine, 2011). For example, models of 
coupled human–natural systems typically treat their embedded social components with less 
sophistication than their physics-based ecological ones (Burke, Joseph, Pasick, & Barker, 2009). 
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What results are idealized, sanitized, and apolitical views of reality for the convenience of science 
that have no bearing on the policy decisions (Latour, 2005; Paolisso, 2009; Peterson, Peterson, & 
Peterson, 2005). Managing shared natural resources are social and political activities that involve 
considerations of who has the right to use the resource as well as determining behavioral targets 
of policy, including prohibited activities (cf. Ascough II, Maier, Ravalico, & Strudley, 2008; 
Dryzek, 1997; Kemmis, 1990; Odum, 2007). 
Policy reflects and shapes the social order. While scientific expertise can provide high quality 
technical information to managers, local decision-making cultures still retain authority under 
existing power dynamics that can inhibit sustainable policy efforts (Peterson, et al., 2005). Despite 
an acknowledgement of the importance of power relationships within natural resource planning, 
“little empirical attention has been paid to exploring the workings of power in the field” (Courtois 
& Tazdaït, 2007; Raik, Wilson, & Decker, 2008, p. 730; Robbins, 2012). If models of social–
ecological systems are to improve the productivity of sustainability policy making, they must 
satisfy multiple audiences’ perspectives of reality by incorporating familiar dynamics of social 
power. This means giving greater attention to the complexities of social groups, human behaviors, 
and decision-making processes.  
 
1.3 Integrating Social Power and Political Influence 
In this essay, we seek to address the challenges of incorporating social-system dynamics 
into coupled human–natural system modeling by providing an example of a conceptual model of 
social complexity in a natural-resource system. Specifically, we seek to integrate notions of social 
power and political influence into a form amenable to mathematical systems modeling. To 
accomplish this, we use sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1985; 1986; 1989; 1990; 1993) theory of 
social capital to fashion a common language between natural and social capital. We model natural-
resource management decision making regarding the cumulative impacts of social and ecological 
responses to various management options regarding floodplain development. To provide site-
specific data for illustrating how this model would operate, we use qualitative ethnographic 
interview data gathered through a cultural inventory of the Yellowstone River (Montana, USA) 
(cf. Gilbertz, Horton, & Hall, 2007; Gilbertz, Austin, Norton, Horton, & Hall, 2011; Hall, 2006; 
Hall, Gilbertz, Horton, & Peterson, 2012). The conceptual model demonstrates the integration of 
qualitative social data into a mathematical ecological systems model that addresses the influence 
and dynamics of social power within rural riverfront communities in Montana.   
The multi-agent simulation model we offer here is designed to advance the discussion of how 
structures of social power could influence a coupled systems model. This conceptual model 
illustrates that careful examination of social influence can be integrated into modeling efforts to 
appropriately account for the complexity of coupled natural-human systems. This can lead to 
more socially robust models (Gibbons, 1999; 2000) that are more legitimate to communities as 
well as to the improvement of group-based modeling processes (mediated modeling, co-modeling, 
companion modeling, participatory modeling, etc.) (Hall et al., 2014; Levrel, Etienne, Kerbiriou, 
Le Page, & Rouan, 2009; van den Belt, 2004; Voinov & Bousquet, 2010).  
First, we describe the socio-political dynamics of the Upper Yellowstone River that comprise the 
planning exigencies and source data for this project. Next, we describe Bourdieu’s theory of 
capitals and how we have adapted its use for modeling social power within the decision setting. 
Then we describe specifically how we move these notions into a conceptual model. We end with 
a discussion of project implications that we hope contributes to the broader challenge of 
balancing otherwise imbalanced levels of detail in modeled social and ecological representations 
of coupled-systems problems in order to make more salient, legitimate, and credible models for 
collaborative decision making in sustainability contexts.  
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2. Case: Riverfront Development along the Yellowstone River 
 
The conceptual model presented here responds to a management dilemma faced by US 
federal, state and local organizations with interests in development and responsibilities for 
natural-resource management. The specific context in this case focuses on riparian setback 
ordinances (streamside buffer management zones) that regulate floodplain development along the 
Yellowstone River. The jurisdictional scale selected is Park County, Montana. We selected Park 
County because (1) the county level is the most typical scale for decisions made concerning 
zoning decisions in Montana, (2) this socio-economically diverse community routinely engages in 
decision making concerning riverfront development and (3) the upstream section of the river 
exhibits development trends similar to those increasingly common in downstream communities 
(Chapple, 1997; Gilbertz et al., 2007). Decision-making scenarios in Park County thus serve as a 
representative exemplar for events likely to affect other, downstream communities along the 
Yellowstone River.  
We use a subset of the socio-economic data collected from the Yellowstone River Cultural 
Inventory (YRCI) (Gilbertz et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2012) to simulate stakeholder decision-making 
dynamics among three dominant stakeholder populations: agricultural landowners, investment 
landowners, and recreational outfitters. The subset (N=57, equal to approximately 1/5 of the 
total sample size) of the YRCI is used to delimit the study to Park. Using a subset also enables 
future verification studies.  
The 2006 YRCI was a large-sample naturalistic field study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) consisting of 
in-depth ethnographic interviews with 313 Yellowstone River landowners, agriculturalists, civic 
managers, and recreationalists across 540 river miles (cf. Gilbertz et al., 2007; Hall et al. 2012). 
The study constituted the social-cultural dimensions of a larger ten-year $10 million USD 
cumulative-effects study on the Yellowstone River funded by the US Army Corps of Engineers. 
The YRCI aimed to understand (1) how riverfront stakeholders conceptualized river management 
practices, (2) the ecological properties of the river including how they valued the riparian area and 
(3) how informants thought riverfront land-use conflicts should be managed. Interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, using open-ended questions as a means of encouraging residents to talk 
about the river, the local environs, and their personal observations and concerns freely and in 
their own words.  
The Yellowstone River catchment is large relative to other catchments in the American West. The 
river basin drains an area over 181,000 km2 (70,000 mi2) from its headwaters above Yellowstone 
National Park to the confluence with the Missouri River in North Dakota. The Yellowstone River 
also is the United States’ longest undammed river. The natural features of the river make 
riverfront lands desirable to agriculturalists, recreationalists, and real-estate investors. The large 
volume of water discharged by the river affords high agricultural productivity; its waters are used 
for irrigation in an otherwise arid landscape with an average annual rainfall of 38 cm (14.8 in). The 
free-flowing character of the river creates biological and scenic amenities attractive to recreational 
users. The cold-water riparian habitat supports a wild trout population earning the designation of 
a Blue Ribbon Trout Stream (Leighton, 1998) including the endangered cutthroat trout 
(Oncorhynchus clarki bouvieri). As notoriety of the fishery and related river recreation has spread in 
recent decades, increasing numbers of people have bought property and built homes near the 
river (Hall, Gilbertz, Horton, & Peterson, 2013). The scenic and recreational opportunities 
continue to attract visitors, retirees, and vacationers as the fastest growing economic sector in 
Park County. As a result, riverfront development within the 100-year floodplain has increased 
throughout rural stretches of the river. From 1980 to 2000 the number of structures within Park 
County’s floodplain increased from 379 to 594 buildings; a 57% increase (BBC Consulting, 2002; 
Tempting Fate, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 2002). Large portions of the valley floodplain were 
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converted from riparian vegetation to lawns, homes, and impervious surfaces. 
Because the riparian area is limited, all land-use interests must compete. Competing desires for the 
river’s characteristics are further constrained by its undammed character, which causes seasonal 
flooding due to melting mountain snowpack each June. These high-volume flows alter the river’s 
channel by erode streambanks, impacting productive agricultural lands, residential properties, and 
public infrastructure.  
 
2.1 The Politics of Flood Control 
There are two ways to mitigate the risks and damages from this flooding. The most 
common way for property owners to mitigate against erosion and overbank flooding is through 
the use of in-stream and streambank stabilization structures such as rip-rap—boulders placed 
along the banks to deflect the velocity of floodwaters. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) in conjunction with state agencies (Montana Department of Environmental Quality), 
county conservation districts and county floodplain administrators regulate bank-stabilization 
projects through permits under the authority of Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 
(33 U.S.C. § 401) and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: the Clean Water 
Act (CWA; 33 U.S.C. § 1344). The permitted deployment of structures to protect high-risk 
properties restricts and diverts stream flow, which inhibits normal water-storage functions of the 
riparian vegetation. Such diversion also changes the riparian system by increasing flow velocity at 
other banks, thereby intensifying downstream flooding and erosion and inadvertently affecting 
other biophysical changes. Long-term geomorphologic and biological impacts include 
channelization of the river which disrupts natural flood control, narrowing floodplains which 
exacerbate soil recharge, native vegetation and riparian forest regeneration, the downstream 
spread of exotic (invasive) vegetation, aquatic and terrestrial habitat suitability, and other 
downstream erosion (cf. Ellis & Richard, 2008; Naiman & Decamps, 1997; Ward, Tockner, & 
Schiemer, 1999). 
The second and less common means of dealing with flood risk is through riverfront zoning 
restrictions. Zoning decisions occur at the county and local community levels. These land-use 
planning policies regulate development along the river and within the 500-year floodplain beyond 
minimum standards required for participation within the U.S.’s Federal Emergency management 
Agency’s (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) which Park County joined in 1987. 
The current riparian setback ordinance limits development within 150 feet (~46m) of the river’s 
high-water mark in order to qualify for the NFIP (Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2005). These local 
zoning decisions impact riparian habitat, floodplain functioning, and, as a result, affect the 
severity and frequency of flooding. For this undammed river, as its channel migrates, so too do 
the risks of flooding (Thatcher, et al., 2009).  
Increasing awareness of short- and long-term impacts of riverfront residential development has 
led to increased interest in zoning ordinances and floodplain planning (cf. Hazard Mitigation Plan, 
2005). For years, landowners have cited political and economic rationales such as private property 
rights for thwarting any attempts at regulating riverfront zoning law. This enabled them to sub-
divide, develop, and otherwise use the lands within the riparian corridor to their immediate 
advantage. Citizens frequently voice concern about the rate of development within the floodplain, 
yet a strong private-property rights ethos in the region often prevents zoning efforts (Peterson 
and Liu, 2008).  
As more homes are built along the river, flooding prompts more homeowners to install bank 
stabilization projects. For example, in 1996 and 1997, two consecutive 100-year floods caused 
damages of $1.6 million USD in 1996 and $750k USD in 1997 (in 2005 USD; Hazard Mitigation 
Plan, 2005), and a record number of bank stabilization permits were applied for and granted 
(Auble et al., 2004). Recreationalists became concerned about the impacts of these bank altering 
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projects upon the fishery and the aesthetic qualities of the river. Fears over these impacts 
prompted the National Geographic to call the Yellowstone “America’s last best river” and the 
American Rivers NGO placed the Yellowstone on its Top ten List of Endangered Rivers in 1999 
(Chapple, 1997) and again in 2005 due to the increased rate of development within the 100-year 
floodplain (DeVries, 2006). 
In November of 1997, Montana’s Governor became concerned about the adverse impacts of 
increased floodplain development and bank stabilization projects upon the river’s tourism 
industry. He initiated the Governor’s Upper Yellowstone River Task Force to involve publics in 
research that would encourage a more comprehensive and consolidated planning effort (Task 
Force Final Report, 2003). Additionally, a collaboration of recreational and environmental 
organizations filed a successful lawsuit requiring the USACE to examine the cumulative effects of 
bank stabilization upon riparian habitat (Montana Council of Trout Unlimited v. Corps of Engineers). A 
moratorium was placed on new bank stabilization projects in 2001, but no additional zoning 
setbacks to control riverfront development have been enacted despite unsuccessful efforts to pass 
county-level policies in 2004, 2006, and 2008 (Nolt, 2007) and at the state-level Big Sky Rivers Act 
(MT HB-455) in 2009 (Lowery, 2009).  
 
3. Adaptation of Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Capital  
 
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital provides a potentially useful 
approach for understanding the Yellowstone's socio-political relationships among advocates of 
competing interests, norms, and social processes, and the ways in which those relationships are 
entwined in the fluvial and ecological dynamics of the river itself.  
In formal terms, capital is the human capacity to act upon a system based on relative position in 
the social and ecological logics of a situation. Bourdieu’s (1985, 1986, 1989, 1990, & 1993) theory 
of capital addresses how capital accumulation enables participants to influence social systems. 
Bourdieu represents the social world as a self-producing field of hierarchies where agents compete 
for material and symbolic resources. This competition organizes the positions of the persons 
within it. Such relations are so familiar that agents often fail to recognize how thoroughly they are 
embedded in practices that reinforce existing positions of power (Bourdieu, 1989).  
Bourdieu describes society as a game (1993) where capital refers to the resources that provide 
players with social power with which to play. Key to this argument, is the expansion of the 
treatment of capital beyond economics to include social (affiliative) and cultural resources (1989). 
The amount of aggregate capital and the hierarchical arrangement of types of capital in a 
particular social order influence an agent’s position and capacity for playing the game (1985).  
Following Bourdieu (1986, 1990), we identify three sub-types of capital that combine to create a 
player’s total symbolic capital. Economic capital refers to financial resources, such as money and 
property; affiliative capital refers to resources of affiliation, social connectivity, and networking 
capacities that are central to negotiating social norms; and cultural capital refers to resources of 
prestige that are embodied, objectified, and institutionalized in educational credentials, aesthetic 
preferences, general cultural awareness, and verbal facility. All three combine to create social capital, 
or the relative weight and composition of an individual’s legitimate power and social credibility 
within a location.  
 
4. Model Description 
 
An explicit modeling of influence and power in social systems may enable managers and 
planners to visualize the potential impacts on ecological systems and decision-making. The model 
we describe here accounts for vested individuals and social power within decision-making groups 
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and how their decisions interact with riparian ecology as the principal form of natural capital in 
this system. The material transferred within this model is capital in both social and natural forms. 
The model consists of four nested and interactive sub-models: (1) three individual stakeholder 
populations and their total accumulation of three forms of capital described above; (2) the 
decision-making process concerning riverfront development zoning restrictions; (3) the natural 
capital of the functioning riparian floodplain; and (4) the frequency and severity of stochastic 
flood events. The social and natural capitals affect, and are affected by, the decision-making 
process of setback policies and setback outcome. The severity of flooding acts as a catalyst for 
initiating the decision-making process. 
 
4.1 Stakeholder Capital 
The model includes three stakeholder populations to simulate the setback decision-
making process. These stakeholders are riverfront real estate investment landowners (Inv), 
agricultural landowners (Agr), and recreationalists with outdoor experience-based business 
interests (Rec). Each stakeholder group has a unique magnitude of influence represented by their 
total accumulation of social capital. This total social capital (CapTot) consists of a combination of 
(1) economic capital (Econ), (2) affiliative capital (Aff), and (3) cultural capital (Cul).  
The economic capital values of each stakeholder group refer to income and financial assets 
owned. The affiliative capital values are derived from the number of social organizations and 
networks to which an individual belongs. It represents the stakeholder group’s embeddedness in 
social and political structures. Cultural capital is both embodied and institutionalized. Embodied 
cultural capital is derived from the number of generations one’s family has owned land in the 
county; it represents rootedness in the community, accumulates with successive generations and 
cannot be stripped from a person. Institutionalized cultural capital derives from educational 
credentials denoting expertise, such as certifications or academic degrees (Bourdieu, 1986).  
The numbers used to represent stakeholder groups’ cumulative capital, the relative weighting 
between the forms of capital, and the rates of capital gains and losses are derived from field 
observations, in-depth interviews, local advisors, and U.S. Census Bureau data. Based on our field 
observations and analysis from the YRCI, these three forms of capital are consistently regarded 
among Park County participants as measures of influence within community decision making 
groups. The forms of capital exist in a hierarchy with relative weighting (Rel Eco, Rel Cul, and Rel 
Aff) (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Relative weights of the influence of each sub-type of capital 
Types of Capital Relative Weight 
Cultural 0.40 
Economic 0.30 
Affiliative 0.30 
 
For the setting in Park County, we weighted each form of capital according to the relative 
influence based on 57 interviews (14 agriculturalists, 16 recreationalists, 27 other riverfront 
landowners and managers). Persons consistently given the most deference within the community 
are those whose families “homesteaded” the land they currently own (US Homestead Acts of 
1862 & 1909). Therefore, for these agents, cultural capital is given more weight (Cul = 0.40) 
relative to economic and affiliative capital (Econ 0.30; Aff = 0.30). In Park County, having money 
is slightly more important than having a dense interpersonal network of social ties. The relative 
weighting of the types of social capital can be adjusted depending upon the context. The total 
sum of all three forms of capital for all stakeholders who comprise a group is taken as that 
stakeholder population’s total capital (CapTot), and reflects their collective influence within the 
decision-making process. The maximum amount of capital accumulation for each type of capital 
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is represented on a 1–100 unit scale. The maximum total capital accumulation from the three 
forms of capital that a group can have is 300. Each stakeholder group’s initial CapTot scores are 
listed in Table 2. The maximum amount of capital operating in the society is denoted as CapTot 
Society.  
 
Table 2. Initial capitals of stakeholder populations 
Stakeholder Group Economic Capital 
Affiliative 
Capital 
Cultural 
Capital: Heritage 
Total Capital 
(Baseline) 
Investment Landowner 100 100 25 225 
Recreationalist Outfitter 50 100 50 200 
Agricultural Landowner 75 75 75 225 
 
4.2 Population of stakeholder decision makers 
Each population is represented as a sub-model showing the three forms of capital (Cul, 
Eco, Aff), their population (Num), with a specific setback policy preference (Pref) expressed in feet 
from the river. These interests and forms of capital affect and are affected by the other sub-
models of capital accumulation (e.g., floodplain functioning) and the decision-making process.  
To account for the shifting numbers of decision-making stakeholders in this system over time 
that will impact the decision calculus, each stakeholder category is represented as a population 
(i.e., NumRes, NumAgr, etc.). These numbers are derived from U.S. Census Bureau economic data 
and USDA Principal Farm Operator census data for Park County, MT (Table 3), and adjusted by 
emigration (Em) and immigration (Imm) rates based on US census records. To account for only 
those agricultural stakeholders along the river, the USDA Principal Farm Operator census figures 
were adjusted using a 2003 GIS study that found that approximately 12% of all Park County rural 
land parcels (Montana Natural Resource Information System) occurred within 600 feet of the 
existing 100-year floodplain using (American Rivers and Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 2003). 
The 2003 study excludes parcels within the city limits of Livingston, MT, as the city’s flood 
management program manages development within its floodplain.   
 
Table 3. Index for stakeholder population ratios in Park County, MT NAICS number of employees of 
March 12 per year 
Stakeholder Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agricultural (a) 82 85 80 76 73 82 81 82* 83* 
Investment Landowner (b) 37 20-99 * 43 38 44 58 48 49 20-99* 
Recreationalist Outfitter (c) 100 73 78 79 105 106 138 114 121 
 
Shading indicates years with complete data. 
(a) USDA principal farm operator Census x .12 (1997, 2002, 2007 figures) + [11] Forestry, fishing, 
hunting, and agriculture support. (b) [53] Real estate & rental & leasing. (c) [71] Arts, 
entertainment & recreation. (d) Non Ag parcels from 2003 (750) indexed to US Census 2003 
(15859) = (0.047281759) x US Census figures from 2000 and 2005. (*) US Census estimate. 
 
4.3 Decision-making Process 
The three stakeholder populations’ capital sub-models meet in the decision-making sub-
model to determine revisions to county floodplain buffer-zone ordinance. The policy in 
discussion dictates how far from the riverbank new development—new buildings, improvements 
to buildings, grading, filling, and other human-caused changes to the land—should be set back 
from the high water mark of the streambank (Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2005). The current Park 
County riparian setback ordinance is 150 feet (~46m) (Ellis and Richard, 2008). Each group has a 
preferred setback distance (SetPref) that will increase their economic and affiliative capital (Table 
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4).  
Management (Mgmt) holds primary decision authority. However, resource management agencies 
can be over-ruled by significant social pressure, such as lawsuits, when management agencies lose 
public support. Management objectives (Pref Mgmt) are established to ensure that there is a certain 
amount of riparian area (Mgmt Max Nat) and considers setback decision making upon this 
preferred amount of functioning riparian area.   
 
Table 4. Stakeholder group’s setback preferences and affected capitals 
Stakeholder 
Group 
 
Current 
Setback 
(in Feet)
Setback 
Preference
(in Feet) 
Setback Preference 
 
Setback 
Decision 
Impacts: 
% Riparian 
Area 
Impacts: 
Investment 
Landowners 
150 0 No restrictions: Allows for maximum property 
value for resale and subdivision 
Aff, Econ  
Recreational  
Outfitters 
150 500 Restore quality of resource to improve quality 
of recreational experience; Increase business 
due to natural amenities of river; Protect 
valuable wildlife species and habitat 
Aff, Econ Econ 
Agricultural 
Landowners 
150 100 No change in restrictions: Allows for 
maximum property value for resale and 
subdivision; Adheres to a common ethos of 
“private property rights” protection; 
Desire increased quality of riverfront livestock 
forage; and less need for exotic species 
management and associated expenses 
Aff, Econ Econ 
 
The stakeholder group with the highest total accumulated capital will likely influence (Social 
Pressure) the setback decision based on his/her preference (winner). However, a stochastic 
corrective (ran) is built into this decision-making function which accounts for extenuating external 
factors, events, and circumstances that may affect the power balances in the decision-making 
landscape.  
Stakeholder groups can pool their capital in coalitions (coal). If a coalition can reach a certain 
politically-relevant threshold (CapTotCoalPlus > Social Pressure Threshold)—such as using affiliative 
capital to mobilize social networks to successfully initiate and pass a ballot referendum—then the 
coalition exerts social pressure for their preferred setback policy. If they pool their capital and do 
not meet the social pressure threshold then they cannot exercise social pressure upon the decision 
making as a coalition. 
 
4.4 Time Scale 
While the time step for the simulation is yearly, decisions concerning the streamside 
buffer management on the Yellowstone River occur irregularly. Decisions are often prompted 
when a confluence of social, political, and environmental factors exert pressure on Mgmt agencies. 
For example, riparian planning has been precipitated by changes in resource law and bureaucratic 
structures (1974 Clean Water Act), significantly severe seasonal flood events (Governor’s Task 
Force in 1997 following two 100-year floods of 1996 and 1997), changes in political personalities 
and demographics (election cycle of 2012), etc. Therefore decision making is not tied to any 
periodicity but is relative to particular flood events—typically in June—severe enough for local 
community members to decide policy changes are necessary.  
 
4.5 Natural capital: Native riparian vegetation  
We represent natural capital as the percent of unaffected riparian floodplain, which is 
based on the percent of unmodified stream bank which allows for normal channel migration and 
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riparian floodplain function (Thatcher et al., 2009). The amount of unaltered floodplain is viewed 
as an indicator of ecosystem stability with regards to mitigating flood damage (Mitsch and 
Gosselink, 2007). As the amount of floodplain in a riparian system decreases—through 
decreasing setback requirements—flood damage increases in severity due to the loss of flood 
water storage functioning of riparian vegetation. Increasing amounts of floodplain area leads to 
increased capacity of vegetation to store flood overbank waters (Mitsch and Gosselink, 2007).  
Riparian area changes as a result of increasing or decreasing Setback zoning decisions, namely, a 
larger setback increased riparian floodplain area and a smaller setback decreased it. We assumed 
setback decisions affect the functioning of the riparian area within the 100-year floodplain on a 
sigmoid growth curve: 0 ft of setback = 0% functional riparian area; 150 ft setback = 80% 
functional riparian area; 500 ft setback = 100% functional riparian area. 
 
4.6 Flooding 
The most significant variables acting as catalysts for stakeholder populations to initiate 
the decision making are (1) the frequency of flood events (Flood Freq) and (2) the severity of flood 
events (Flood Severity). Flood events are generated stochastically, and the type of flood (i.e., 1, 5, 
25, 50, 100, or 500-year flood) is based on historic flood occurrences for the region (Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, 2005). Flood frequency is calculated as the number of flood events occurring in 
subsequent years. We assumed flood severity was a function of the type of flood as well as the 
percent of riparian area remaining. Due to the large amount of uncertainty associated with the 
relationship between flood damage and percent riparian floodplain, we represented the 
relationship between flood percent riparian area remaining and flood damage as an index (RAI) 
and performed an extensive calibration on this parameter, altering both the magnitude and 
functional form of the relationship.  
 
4.7 Feedback: natural capital to social capital 
Flood severity and flood frequency are the catalysts for setback decision-making. The 
investment landowners’ (Inv) setback preference is not driven by the risk of flooding. Their 
capitals are affected by flooding only to the degree that flood severity influences the capacity to 
develop floodplain properties. Therefore, groups of investment landowners will advocate for less 
setback or exhibit neutrality if there is frequent or severe flooding. The recreationalists’ (Rec) 
setback preference is as large as possible, because more riparian area increases recreational 
opportunities and the quality of experience, thus increasing the recreationalist’s total capital. 
Recreationalists use frequent and severe flooding as an additional rationale for more riparian area 
to store flood water and to mitigate against damage. The agricultural landowners (Agr) want less 
setback regulation so they can retain the option to sell valuable riverfront parcels and marginal 
agricultural lands. However, if there is frequent or severe flooding, agriculturalists will advocate 
for a larger setback preference to protect productive agricultural lands from flooding.  
 
4.8 Decision Outcome: Setback Ordinance Effects on Stakeholder Groups’ Total Capital 
The Setback decision impacts the affiliative and economic capitals of all stakeholders. 
Because the outcome ultimately favors one group’s setback preference, the "winning" group that 
benefits most from the decision sees their economic capital earning potential increase. The 
winning group’s affiliative capital—their political clout—also increases within the decision-making 
setting. Once a setback decision is made, the winning stakeholder group whose preferred setback 
distance was selected (winner) earns 5 affiliative capital units because their preference proved 
socially acceptable (Table 5). The winning stakeholder group also earns a specific amount of 
economic capital (Table 6) as a result of the decision. Those stakeholder populations whose 
preferences were not selected are negatively affected by the decision outcome. They lose 5 
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affiliative capital points (Table 5) and economic capital points (Table 7) because of the impact 
upon their earning potentials and political clout respectively. Each round of decision making has 
the potential to alter the total capital arrangements. The decision outcome cannot affect a 
stakeholder groups’ levels of cultural capital, as heritage increases only by generation, and this 
credentialing occurs independently of changes in natural capital. 
For the most part, the model is designed to mimic real-world scenarios of “the rich get richer” 
where those groups with a majority of accumulated capital continue to increase capital in the 
model structure at a greater rate than those with less total capital. Extenuating stochastic factors 
(Ran) may influence this structure representing dramatic changes such as severe flooding events 
or changes in state or federal policies that trump this local planning venue. Each positive impact 
upon stakeholder groups’ capital reaches a maximum level of improvement (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Impacts of receiving setback preference on political clout 
Social Capital 
Improvements 
Effects of Receiving 
Preference 
Max Aff 
pts 
Effects of Not Receiving 
Preference 
Max Aff 
pts 
Aff Inv Increased Political Clout 5 Decreased Political Clout 5 
Aff Agr Increased Political Clout 5 Decreased Political Clout 5 
Aff Rec Increased Political Clout 5 Decreased Political Clout 5 
 
Table 6. Impacts and rationale for economic improvements due to increased native vegetation 
Economic 
Capital 
Improvement 
Effects of Increased Percent Riparian Area: Justification of weights Max Eco pts@ 
100% Riparian 
Area 
Eco Rec • Improved aesthetic and scenic quality of the river  
• Increased recreational opportunities for personal and business uses 
• Suitable aquatic habitat for fish prey species and fish  
• Woody debris and leaf litter input for habitat diversity for invertebrates 
and fish 
• Increased shade maintains suitable stream temperature for game 
species spawning while lowering potential fishing restrictions due to 
high water temperatures  
• Increased shade also reduces algae growth which improves quality of 
fishing experience and increases dissolved oxygen for game species 
• Enhanced bottomland and upland terrestrial species diversity due to 
suitable habitat, cover, and connectivity thus improving bird-watching, 
wildlife viewing, and hunting opportunities 
• Improved native vegetation cover enhances privacy for fishing, 
boating, and hiking 
• Improved bank stability due to vegetation rooting reduces turbidity 
and provides underwater refuge for aquatic species during flooding 
• Improved native vegetative cover also increases water quality by 
filtering contaminants from residential and commercial sources which 
negatively impact groundwater and aquatic habitat suitability  
30 
Eco Agr • Improving quality and diversity of forage for livestock grazing 
• Improving bank stability and reduces loss of land due to erosion  
• Improving a sense of certainty from erosion losses 
• Reducing exotic weed species management costs and time 
• Increasing bottomland and upland terrestrial species diversity via 
enhancing suitable habitat, cover, and connectivity thus improving 
hunting lease opportunities  
20 
Eco Inv • Improved aesthetic and biological quality of the river = improved 
property value  
 
0 
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At 100% Riparian Area, the maximum economic capital an Agriculturalist earns is 20 points. At 
100% Riparian Area, the maximum economic capital a Recreationalist earns is 30 points. Even at 
100% Riparian Area, the Investment Landowner gains no economic capital because the losses of 
economic freedom greatly outweigh any gains in aesthetic value. 
 
Table 7. Impacts and rationale for economic improvements due to decreased native vegetation 
Economic Capital 
Improvements  
Effects of Decreased Percent Riparian Area: 
Justification of weights 
Max Eco pts @ 0% 
Riparian Area 
Eco Inv  • Improved access to developable areas  
• Improved ability to subdivide parcels  
30 
Eco Agr • Improved freedom to subdivide parcels and 
develop land 
20 
Eco Rec • Loss of quality of recreational experience -5 
 
At 0% Riparian Area, the maximum economic capital an Investment Landowner earns is 30 
points.   
At 0% Riparian Area, the maximum economic capital an Agriculturalist earns is 20 points.   
At 0% Riparian Area, the Recreationalist loses 5 economic capital points. 
 
Table 8. Catalysts for initiating decision-making process by stakeholder population 
Setback Preference in various catalyzing conditions: 
 Infrequent Flooding Frequent flooding Severity of flood low Severity of flood high 
INV – 0 – 0 
REC + + + + 
AGR – + – + 
– = less setback preference 
+ = more setback preference  
0= no resistance or advocacy  
 
The Setback decision has an instant social impact and a delayed ecological impact through either 
an immediate increase (RA in) or decrease (RA out) in functional Riparian area; that change in 
natural capital as result of the setback outcome feeds back to a recalculation of social impact in 
the next time step. The Setback decision’s impact upon affiliative capital is immediate. The winners 
win (setback favors preference) and the losers lose (setback does not favor preference) affiliative 
power to influence the decision-making group. Therefore, impact on economic capital is also 
instantaneous in that the freedom to legally use or sell space along the river is permitted or 
prohibited after the setback decision is made. The various setback decisions also influence the 
riparian area. 
 
5. Discussion   
 
To make environmental decisions, requires fashioning an imagined or mental model of 
the system from which to deliberate about consequences of possible options (Jones, Ross, Lynam, 
Perez, & Leitch, 2011). In groups, these shared mental models become cultural models formed 
discursively evidenced by multiple forms of data, story, experience, etc. (Paolisso, 2002). When 
scientific experts are invited to develop technical representations of these systems familiar to 
residential decision makers, the realities of socio-political forces such as social influence and the 
uses of various forms of power should be considered if the model is to be a useful tool for 
decision making. An unrealistic or idealized representation of a familiar system will be dismissed 
as lacking salience, credibility, and legitimacy with local audiences of decision makers. Where 
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technically-trained experts evaluate models based on the adherence to biophysical rules, non-
technical audiences evaluate models based the presence or absence of components that reflect 
their personal experiences and tacit knowledge of the represented system (Hall et al. 2014). For 
models to serve as effective boundary objects that enable the integration of system assumptions 
and facilitate decision making, they must be meaningful to audiences expected to implement the 
decisions.  
Bourdieu’s forms of capital offer one means of representing non-material forms of wealth, 
cultural, and social affiliation which act as forms of influence within politics of shared resource 
decision making. Representing power and influence in terms of material capital enables modelers 
a form of currency to illustrate the impact of human capital on natural capital (ecological 
services/functioning). Further, the commensurate language of capital allows models to display a 
hypothetical policy’s influence on the accumulation of types of capital among social players and 
ecological systems.  
We hope others find this medium of capital useful in constructing more nuanced social-ecological 
models to illustrate interactions with greater sophistication. As tools that bridge differing 
communities engaged in a working relationship, boundary objects, like models, permit the rules of 
authoring agencies to be bent if it suits the needs of the partnership (Guston, 2001). Successful 
integration of different ways of knowing into models may require breaking some established 
norms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this essay, we constructed a conceptual model that used the social theory of various 
forms of social capital articulated by Bourdieu to make explicit the subtleties of influence that 
occur within rural communities on the Yellowstone River in park County, MT, USA. We used 
largely qualitative data from face-to-face ethnographic interviews to structure this model. Our 
next steps are to build a mathematical model and to run the model with an audience of Park 
County Montanans to solicit feedback on the salience of the model. The aim is to develop a 
model that is a realistic representation of the relatively obdurate biophysical and socio-political 
facts of the valley that any agile decision making must navigate.  
Natural resource management agencies must balance the risks of losses in natural capital and 
losses in public support. This modelling approach could guide agents through the anticipation of 
scenarios likely to occur as publics respond to agency decisions, which lead to an ecological 
response that, in turn, influences future public response. A model that incorporates more 
sophisticated socio-political factors, like locally known realities of power and influence, may 
explain how seeming small decisions made by agencies may yield large responses in both public 
satisfaction and ecosystem function over time.  
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